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I. INTRODUCTION
Cities are pursuing various initiatives to implement President Clinton's
National Information Agenda ("NIP').' The NII encourages public/private
partnerships to build an advanced telecommunications infrastructure known as
the Information Highway. These initiatives include upgrading cities' internal
government networks or Private Virtual Networks ("PVNs") 2 and expanding
Municipal Utilities3 into, or developing new, Regional Telecommunication
Networks ("RTNs"). This article will focus on city initiatives as developers,
regulators, and users of RTNs and will highlight California's efforts in these
areas. RTNs are region wide, open, switched digital broadband networks with
the capability to provide voice, data, cable, and videoconferencing services at a
reasonable cost to homes, businesses, and public buildings.4 RTNs compete
with existing and other providers for telecommunication services and are
regulated by the Telecommunications Act of 1996 ("Act").5
Cities have a vested interest in RTNs for several reasons: 1) to protect the
public safety and welfare; 2) to enhance internal operations and the admini-
stration of services to the public; 3) to foster economic development; and 4) to
1. The National Information Infrastructure: Agenda for Action, 58 Fed. Reg. 49,025
(1993).
2. Private Virtual Networks are networks which service a city's internal or regional needs
for government operations and administration. Examples would include communication and
data networks for libraries, schools, fire, police, and public works. See San Diego Data
Processing Corporation Request for Proposals to Provide Telecommunications Infrastructure
7 (1995) [hereinafter San Diego RFP].
3. "Municipal Utilities" are municipally owned public utilities that can provide telephony
or other communications and other public works, such as electric, gas, water, sewer and/or
other utility services to residents. See, e.g., CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 12801 (Deering 1990)
(regarding Municipal Utility District Act).
4. See San Diego RFP, supra note 2, at 1; August E. Grant & Lon Berquist, Exploring the
Emerging Municipal Information Infrastructure (visited Dec. 11, 1996) <http://ksgwww.
harvard.edu/iip/grant.html>; City of Seattle Request for Proposals for an Information Highway
1 (1994) [hereinafter Seattle RFP].
5. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996)
[hereinafter the Act]. The Act overhauls the Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 1, 48
Stat. 1064 (1934).
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ensure universal access to telecommunication services at affordable prices. 6 In
addition, many cities rely on revenue generated from telecommunication
providers through franchise fees, compensation for use of public rights-of-way,
and utility user taxes.7
Spurred by recent passage of the Act, cities struggle to pursue strategies
as regulators, users, and/or providers of telecommunication networks and
services.8 As municipal providers and users, the Act establishes a framework
for open competition to all telecommunications 9 services l by lifting restric-
tions imposed on telephone companies and cable companies. and creating a
new class of provider called "telecommunication carriers."' 1 Telecommunica-
tion carriers can provide telecommunication services by constructing their own
facilities or reselling services of existing providers. By lifting the restrictions,
new entrants are allowed to compete in city and regional markets. As regula-
tors, the Act restricts local franchise authority to regulate telecommunication
carriers 12 but may provide compensation to cities for use of their rights-of-
way.' 3 These restrictions threaten to reduce cities' revenue base as the variety
of telecommunication services available is increasing and the transactional
costs for businesses are decreasing.
As cities compete to retain current and attract new businesses, some
believe that cities must build RTNs to ensure that residents and businesses
have equal and universal access to new services at affordable prices. However,
6. See San Diego RFP, supra note 2, at 1; Grant & Berquist, supra note 4, at 5-7; Seattle
RFP, supra note 4, at 1-3; Telecommunications Policy for the City of Sunnyvale, California at
5-6 (November 10, 1995) (adopted February 1996) <http://reality.sgi.comcsp/sunnyvalel
telecom-policy.html> [hereinafter Sunnyvale Telecommunications Policy].
7. Utility user taxes are imposed on users of utilities which include electric, telephone,
cable, gas, and water. The common thread is that they all use public rights-of-way to provide
service.
8. See Sunnyvale Telecommunications Policy, supra note 6, at 5; Andrea L. Johnson,
Legal and Regulatory Issues Confronting Cities in Developing an Interconnected Fiber Optic
Network" The San Diego Model, 20 RurrERs COMPurER & TECH. LJ. 489, 512-25 (1994).
9. 'Telecommunications" is defined as "the transmission, between or among points
specified by the user, of information of the user's choosing, without change in the form or
content of the information as sent and received." Telecommunications Act § 3(a)(48).
10. 'Telecommunications service" is defined as the "offering of telecommunications for a
fee directly to the public, or to such classes of users as to be effectively available directly to
the public, regardless of the facilities used." Id. § 3(a)(51).
11. A "telecommunications carrier" includes any provider of information services on a
common carrier basis, for a fee directly or indirectly to the public, without regard to the
facilities used. See id. § 3(a)(49), (51).
12. Id. § 253(a).
13. Id. § 253(c).
1997]
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financial constraints, uncertainty in technological standards, lack of technical
expertise, and actions by existing telecommunication providers to thwart
competition, challenge cities to remain competitive.
14
The first section of this article will examine how the Act fosters competi-
tion and delegates authority to regulate telecommunication providers and the
reaction from state Public Utility Commissions ("PUCs") and industry. The
second section will discuss critical issues that must be resolved by cities as
providers of RTNs. The third section will discuss how cities seek to leverage
their role as users to get favorable rates and ensure universal access. The
fourth section will discuss the impact of the Act on city initiatives as regulators
of RTNs and sugggests alternate revenue sources.
I. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT
The Act provides a general framework for how competition of interstate,
or interLATA, 15 and intrastate, or intraLATA, 16 telecommunications services
will be achieved and the delegation of authority at the federal, state, and local
levels. This framework enables cities to participate as providers of RTNs to
compete for telecommunication services and as users to leverage favorable
terms with telecommunication providers. Implementation of the Act has been
delegated to the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") and state
PUCs.
A. Fostering Competition
The Act fosters competition for telecommunications services in several
ways. First, state restrictions and antitrust decrees limiting competition in
local exchange and long distance markets have been lifted, thereby allowing
both to expand their offerings. 17 This means that long distance companies 8
14. Grant & Berquist, supra note 4, at 9-11.
15. A LATA, meaning Local Access and Transport Areas, is a geographical boundary that
was established as part of the divestiture of AT&T under Judge Harold Greene's Consent
Decree in 1981. InterLATA telephone services are services, revenues, and functions of long
distance carriers that begin in one LATA and terminate in another. United States v. AT&T,
552 F. Supp. 131 (1982), aff'd sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
Most LATAs are defined by local telephone exchanges or area codes, which are usually within
16 miles from the exchange.
16. IntraLATA services are services, revenues, and functions provided by the local ex-
change carriers within a single LATA.
17. Telecommunications Act § 601(a).
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can provide local exchange services, and local exchange carriers ("LECs")19
can .provide long distance services.2 However, there are restrictions imposed
upon LECs, such as Pacific Bell, before they can provide interLATA services
originating within their service market.2' Such services can only be provided
in partnership with separate or independent affiliates22 of LECs and would be
provided on a negotiated basis.23
Second, cross ownership restrictions for cable 24 and LECs25 have been
eliminated,26 although they are subject to a ten percent cap on financial interest
and ownership 27 in their service area. As a result, cable companies can now
provide telephony, and telephone companies can provide cable or open video
28
services.
Third, LECs must provide interconnection to their facilities, 29 including
physical or virtual collocation of equipment,30 and network access to private
18. Long distance companies include AT&T, MCI, Sprint, and Competitive Access Pro-
viders.
19. Local exchange carriers are the seven Regional Bell Operating Companies: 1) Amer-
itech; 2) Bell Atlantic; 3) Bell South; 4) Nynex; 5) Pacific Telesis; 6) Southwestern Bell; and
7) U.S. West.
20. Telecommunications Act § 27 1(a).
21. In effect, the FCC regulations require that the LEC satisfy a "14-point checklist" of
provisions before the FCC will allow them to enter long distance markets. Essentially the
FCC must find that local markets have been opened up to competition. Id. § 271(c)(2)(B).
22. Section 274 of the Act also prohibits a LEC from providing electronic publishing
using its own or an affiliate's basic telephone facilities, or from forming a joint venture for
electronic publishing, except through a separate and independent affiliate. The Act does,
however, allow: 1) joint telemarketing or referral services on a nondiscriminatory basis; 2)
teaming arrangements for electronic publishing so long as BOC provides only the facilities,
services and basic telephone service and does not own the arrangement; and 3) nonexclusive
joint ventures for electronic publishing where the BOC has no more than 50% equity interest
or royalty interest. Id. § 274(c)(2).
23. See generally id. §§ 272-274.
24. The Act relaxes the rules governing cable television systems under the 1992 Cable
Act. Id. § 301. By March 31, 1999, all rate regulations on all cable services except the "basic
tier" that includes over-the-air channels and public and educational channels are to be
removed. Telecommunications Act § 301(b).
25. Id. § 301(b).
26. See id. § 651(a).
27. Id. § 652(a). This ownership interest can be larger (up to 35%) in rural areas. Id. §
652(d)(1)..
28. Telecommunications Act § 653(a)(1).
29. Section 251(b) imposes on all LECs obligations to provide resale, access to rights-of-
way, and to establish reciprocal compensation arrangements for transportation and termination
of traffic. Id. § 251(b)(1), (4)-(5).
30. Id. § 251(c)(6).
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rights-of-way, utility poles, and conduits on a nondiscriminating basis.31 In
addition, LECs are prevented from discriminating in charges and practicing
unfair competitive tactics,32 which means LECs must provide network access
and interconnection at just and reasonable rates.33 The terms of interconnec-
tion are determined by negotiation between LECs and other telecommunica-
tion providers, 34 subject to approval by state PUCs. 35 State PUCs have the
authority to arbitrate complaints among providers,36 and the FCC has the
authority to resolve jurisdictional issues. Federal courts provide judicial
review of FCC decisions.
Fourth, the Act preempts the states and cities from promulgating any rules
or taking any actions which will be unreasonable and have the effect of
creating market barriers to entry in interstate or intrastate markets.37 The FCC
also has the authority under the Act to preempt city authority where it is found
to violate the Act or state PUC rules, such as prohibiting market entry.38
31. Id. § 251(b)(4), (c)(2)(D). The Act requires interconnection to telecommunication
carriers at any feasible point at least equal in quality to what is provided by LECs to their
affiliates. Id.
32. 47 U.S.C. § 202 (1994). This section provides that it is illegal for common carriers
to:
[M]ake any unjust or unreasonable discrimination in charges, practices, classifi-
cations, regulations, facilities, or services for or in connection with like commu-
nication service, directly or indirectly, by any means or device, or to make or
give any undue or unreasonable preference or advantage to any particular person,
class of persons, or locality, or to subject any particular person, class of persons,
or locality to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage.
Id. § 202(a). This regulation allows the FCC, as a federal agency, to fine violators with a
$6,000 penalty. Id. § 202(c).
33. Rates must be tariffed or not higher than the per unit basis charged to others. Tele-
communications Act § 274(c)(2)(D).
34. Id. § 252(a)(1).
35. Id. § 252(e). Such agreements shall be approved so long as they do not discriminate
against a telecommunications carrier not a party to the agreement and are not inconsistent with
the public interest, convenience, and necessity. Id. § 252(e)(l)-(2).
36. Id. § 252(b). In the first instance, the state PUC would be the arbiter of disputes
between telecommunication carriers and LECs regarding interconnection and charges.
Telecommunications Act § 252(b). Moreover, there is some suggestion that the state PUC
would also address access to rights-of-way and regulatory or negotiated fees imposed by a
city, with appeal rights to the FCC. Id. See generally id. §§ 252, 703.
37. Id. § 253(a). The Act states that "[n]o State or local statute or regulation, or other
State or local legal requirement, may prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the ability of
any entity to provide any interstate or intrastate telecommunications service." Id.
38. Telecommunications Act § 253(d).
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B. Delegation of Authority
The FCC is empowered to establish procedures for network planning and
can participate in developing network interconnectivity standards.39 The FCC
has also created an alternative dispute resolution committee to resolve any
conflicts regarding industry-wide standards.4 The state PUCs are empowered
under the Act to establish baseline rates for interconnection, services, and
network elementsl Local authorities retain jurisdiction over access to their
rights-of-way; however, city franchise authority has been restricted for
telecommunications services, regardless of the provider.
The FCC has recently adopted a series of rules to implement the Act,42
although final adoption is likely to be delayed by legal challenges from
industry and state PUCs. Several state PUCs and LECs have challenged the
FCC's interpretation that the Act confers to it a specific grant of intrastate
pricing authority.43 The FCC rules require discounts of between 17% and 25%
off of their retail phone rates and discounts of between 50% and 60% off the
retail rate of network equipment." If new competitors enter a carrier's market
at wholesale rates, the FCC intended that they could resell telecommunications
services at below market rates because they are willing to accept lower profit
margins.45 LECs feel, however, that the discounts represent illegal confisca-
tion of their property.
C. State Reaction
State reaction to passage of the Act has been varied. Some state PUCs
view the FCC rules in part as a way to neutralize the playing field to enable
new entrants to compete for telecommunications services. The FCC plan
39. Telecommunications Act § 256(b). The parties can agree to terms without regard to
the FCC Rules. The FCC creates a baseline of terms and conditions for all arbitrated
agreements. Commission Adopts Rules to Implement Local Competition Provisions of
Telecommunications Act of 1996 (August 1, 1996) <http:llwww.fcc.gov/nrcc6052.html>.
40. Telecommunications Act § 256(b).
41. Id. § 252(d).
42. See Report on the FCC Implementation of the Telecommunications Act (visited Nov.
21, 1996) <http://www.fcc.gov/Reports/imp-rpt.html>.
43. The Act expressly requires the FCC to refrain from enacting, applying, or enforcing
unnecessary regulations related to charges, practices, and classifications. Telecommunications
Act § 401.
44. Leslie Cauley & Bryan Gruley, Telecommunications: Baby Bells Win Possible Delay
of Competition, WALL ST. J., Oct. 16, 1996, at B1.
45. R. Clark Wadlow & Rosalind M. Parker, Goal of '96 Communication Act is to Foster
Competition, Bus. L. TODAY, Sept.-Oct. 1996, at 11.
1997]
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reflects a concern that state PUCs enjoy a long-standing relationship with
LECs which may cause them to favor LECs.46 However, it seems that many
states have taken heed of the FCC plan. For example, Texas regulators have
approved a plan for AT&T competition with SBC Communications with a
resale discount of 21.5%, within the range proposed by the FCC.47 State
regulators from Iowa, Illinois, Michigan, and Pennsylvania have followed suit,
approving a twenty-two percent discount for reseller services. 48
It is clear that those states that are serious about facilitating competition
are moving forward notwithstanding legal challenges to the Act. There are
more than 180 pending state arbitrations on interconnection agreements among
LECs and other local companies.49 The Washington Utility and Telecommu-
nications Commission ("WUTC"), for example, has already conducted seven
arbitration proceedings under the Act.50 The WUTC is proceeding on generic
costing and pricing rules.51 The arbitrations are leading to interim rates, while
the generic pricing rules will determine long-term pricing.
2
Unfortunately, these efforts are not necessarily the norm. Other state
PUCs feel that the Act and current litigation surrounding FCC interconnection
rules will delay or hinder their efforts to promote intrastate competition. 53 This
is not necessarily due to inaction by state PUCs but rather to efforts by industry
advocates to lobby the FCC and states to accept various interpretations of the
Acti' 4 For example, Brooks Fiber Communications of Grand Rapids, Michi-
gan was haggling for more than a year over an interconnection pact with
Ameritech. The talks were halted after passage of the Act. In addition, in late
1995 prior to passage of the Act, WUTC issued a benchmark decision requir-
46. Cauley & Gruley, supra note 44, at B 1.
47. Gautam Naik & Edward Felsenthal, Business Brief. Justice Thomas Rejects Request
to Reinstate Phone-Market Rules, WALL ST. J., Nov. 1, 1996, at B4.
48. Id.
49. Id. AT&T requested a higher rate of 35%, and SBC only wanted to offer only 13%.
Id.
50. Telephone Interview with Tom Wilson, Regulatory Consultant, Washington Utilities
and Transportation Commission (Dec. 21, 1996). There have been three arbitration decisions,
44 agreements pending negotiation, no final agreements, and two interconnection agreements
under review. See Summary of Federal Telecommunications Act of 1995 (visited July 1,
1996) <http://www.washington.edu: 1 180/wutc/news/fedtelecom.html>.
51. Interview with Tom Wilson, supra note 50.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Cf. Statement of Reed E. Hundt, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission on
Implementation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 Before the Subcommittee on
Telecommunications and Finance Committee on Commerce (July 18, 1996)
<http://www.fcc.gov/Reports/reh7l896.html> [hereinafter Statement of Reed E. Hundt].
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ing local interconnection for U.S. West and GTE.55 Since passage of the Act,
however, they have started the interconnection contract process all over
again.56
D. Industry Reaction Since Passage of the Act
The goal for all providers is to be full service providers, bundling such
existing and new services as local, long distance, and wireless services. Since
the passage of the Act, providers have pursued various strategies to diversify
into other areas, while protecting existing markets. One direct by-product of
the Act is a flurry of mergers.57 There have also been notices of new offerings
with subsequent scaling back of plans, no price reductions, but proposed price
increases.58 Whether the net effect of these efforts will result in competition
remains to be seen.59
Long distance companies and LECs have already begun fierce competi-
tion for the $70 billion long distance market and the $100 billion local service
market.60 Long distance companies, anxious to get into local telephone
markets, have filed for local certification in all fifty states. In a move to
compete for local exchange service, AT&T is proposing to offer preemptive
discount pricing to new customers in several local markets.61 Under this plan,
AT&T would expand pricing discounts to areas such as Illinois, to compete
with Ameritech, by offering three months of free, unlimited "local toll"
55. Implementing the Telecommunications Act '96 (Nov. 30, 1996) <http:www.
Washington.edu/wutc/telecom/act9.html>.
56. Interview with Tom Wilson, supra note 50.
57. Regulators have approved a merger between Bell Atlantic and Nynex and between
Time-Warner and Turner Broadcasting. SBC has bought Pacific Telesis, pending approval
from regulators. LDDS/World Com has bought UUNet, an Internet Provider. World Corn
then bought MFS to make the fourth largest telecommunication vendor in the United States.
British Telecom has bought MCI, to be called Concert. This merger, subject to approval by
the FCC and the Department of Justice, will result in the second largest global carrier after
AT&T. See Charles Stein, For New Year, State Will be Ringing in Much of the Old; Same
Boring Trends Should Mean Good News, B. GLOBE, Jan. 5, 1997, at D6.
58. Mark Robichanx, TCI to Boost Cable Rates, Add Channels in a Bid to Improve Oper-
ating Margins, WALL ST. J., Nov. 22, 1996, at A4. But see Mark Robichanx, Bad Call:
Malone Says TCI Push into Phones, Internet Isn't Working for Now, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2,
1997, at Al.
59. See John R. Wilke & Bryan Gruley, Long-Distance Pitch Hits Snag for Ameritech,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 15, 1997, at B5; John R. Wilke, FCC Sees Slow Growth in Competition,
May Have to Review Deregulation Plans, WALLST. J., Jan. 6, 1997, at B6.
60. John J. Keller, Telecommunications: AT&T Discounts Signal a National Price War
WALL ST. J., May 30, 1996, at BI.
61. Id.
1997]
9
Johnson: A City Guide to Developing, Using, and Regulating Regional Teleco
Published by NSUWorks, 1997
Nova Law Review
calling.62 These discounts are designed to counter efforts by the LECs, in
areas such as Connecticut, to steal market share for long distance service.
Ameritech, Bell Atlantic, and Pacific Telesis have opted to sidestep
regulators to compete for long distance and local telephone service by setting
up separate affiliate local phone companies through long-distance subsidiar-
ies.63 Such companies are unregulated as a result of a loophole created in the
Act.64 This arrangement would permit these LECs to resell local service while
they await approval to compete for long distance service. Essentially, these
65LECs would resell local service to these companies. Many fear, however,
that they will offer better interconnection agreements, thereby undercutting
competition from long distance providers. 66  Moreover, critics argue that
creating separate facilities does not eliminate LEC monopolies in local
markets. While under the LECs' new scheme the name and logo would be
modified, such as Bell Atlantic Communications and Bell Atlantic or Pacific
Bell Communications and Pacific Bell, it is likely that customers will be
confused about where one company ends and the other begins.
67
Notwithstanding these efforts, many existing LECs, long distance, and
cable providers are going to great lengths to protect their own turfs to forestall
competition. 68 Among LECs, Ameritech has persuaded customers to "freeze"
their accounts, which makes it harder for customers to move to new rivals. 69 In
addition, U.S. West has asked regulators to withdraw its Centrex office phone
service to prevent newcomers from reselling Centrex service by its rivals. By
halting Centrex service, U.S. West is effectively undermining competition.
70
Moreover, American Communications Services ("ACSs") has filed a com-
plaint against Bellsouth for charges for network changes. Bell South charges
ACSs only $152 if they alter their network, but charges $17,000 if they move
62. Id.
63. Leslie Cauley, Three Bells Sidestep Rules, Thwart Rivals, WALL ST. J., July 15, 1996,
at A3.
64. Under the Act, LECs must open up their networks to rivals and sell services at non-
discriminatory rates. Such obligations, however, do not extend to their unregulated business,
including long distance service, because it is ancillary to their primary business.
65. Cauley, supra note 63, at A3.
66. Il
67. Id. Polls indicate that some customers still believe AT&T offers local service or that
the Bells offer long distance, something they have been prohibited from doing since 1983. Id.
68. Leslie Cauley, Telecommunications: Telecom Concerns Love Rivalry Fostered by
New Law, Unless It's in Their Market, WALL ST. J., March 25, 1996, at B 1.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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to a competitor.71 Long distance carriers such as AT&T are pushing regulators
to bar the LECs from sharing customer data or marketing. Cable companies
have followed suit. Time-Wamer's HBO network refuses to provide its
programming to Ameritech for Bell's new cable systems. In addition, exclu-
sive contracts with Continental Cablevision, Inc. block it from selling to
Ameritech.
7 2
Whether these current trends will continue remains to be seen. What is
beginning to seem clear is that competition will likely take longer and grow on
a smaller scale than what was initially presumed.
II. CITY INMATrVES AS PROVIDERS OF RTNs
Most governments either own municipal utilities73 or have contracts with
existing telecommunication providers to develop and/or maintain government
information and communications systems. City initiatives involve municipal
utilities who are upgrading or expanding their PVNs,74 or who have accepted
the challenge to upgrade or build municipal RTNs.75 As PVNs are not
regulated by the Act, this discussion will focus on municipal RTNs. RTNs are
subject to regulation under the Act to the extent they provide telecommunica-
tion services to the public indiscriminately, or act as public switched net-
works.76
71. Id.
72. ld.
73. The Constitution of the State of California, for example, permits a municipal corpora-
tion to own or operate public works to provide communications services to the municipality.
CAL CONST., art. XI, § 9(a). Division 5-6 of the California Public Utilities Code ("CPUC")
pertains to the Municipal Utility District Act. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 11501-14403.5
(West 1994). Moreover, a district may construct or own works for supplying the district with
telephone services or other means of communications. Id. § 12801.
74. PVNs do not compete with existing providers for public services and are therefore
exempt from regulation under the Telecommunications Act. There is some indication that at
the point the PVN links to the public switched network it would be subject to state PUC
jurisdiction under the Act. See Rulemaking on the Commission's Own Motion to Govern
Open Access to Bottleneck Services and Establish a Framework for Network Architecture
Development of Dominant Carrier Networks, No. 93-08-026, 1993 Cal. PUC LEXIS 525, at
*5 (Aug. 4, 1993).
75. These cities include: Glasgow, Kentucky; Holland, Michigan; Orangeburg, South
Carolina; Austin, Texas; Denton, Texas; Manassas, Virginia; Seattle, Washington; Anaheim,
California; and Cedar Falls, Iowa. See Grant & Berquist, supra note 4, at 5.
76. See Telecommunications Act § 202(49).
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There are approximately 100 municipal RTN programs underway
throughout the country, most of which were initiated before the Act.77 These
programs reflect a "bottom-up" approach to infrastructure development where
cities, instead of the state, pursue RTNs.78 A "bottom-up" approach has been
used in California, for example, where the cities' needs are too diverse to be
effectively addressed by a statewide initiative. As a result, California cities
undertake infrastructure development on their own, or in partnership with other
cities or counties. California cities such as Anaheim, Santa Clara, San Jose,
and Palo Alto are upgrading existing municipally-owned utilities for residen-
tial telecommunications services. 79 The City of Anaheim, for example, has a
municipally run electric utility and internal telephone system. It has chosen to
compete with existing providers by building a Universal Telecommunications
System connecting the City's businesses, schools, residents, and government
buildings.80 The Anaheim system will utilize fifty miles of the Public Utility
Department existing fiber optic infrastructure.8' The issues confronting these
cities are: 1) how to leverage their role to develop strategic partnerships with
other cities and/or private providers to build RTNs; 2) extract favorable rates
and terms to resell from existing and new providers; or 3) some combination of
the above.
A. Critical Issues in Developing RTNs
Cities must resolve three critical issues in deciding whether to pursue
RTNs. First, cities must decide what type of network architecture will be
employed.8 2 There are a variety of network configurations that can be em-
ployed, such as fiber in the loop,8 3 hybrid fiber/coax84 systems employed by
77. Grant & Berquist, supra note 4, at 2 (citation omitted).
78. Id. at 1 (citation omitted).
79. See Johnson, supra note 8, at 491-92.
80. Grant & Berquist, supra note 4, at 11.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 10.
83. This is an all fiber configuration where fiber is laid up to a node, be it a subscriber's
curb, a building, or a service area. This technology employs a fiber-fed node with dedicated
drops from that node to the subscriber. See also Hamid H. Lalani, The First Hundred Feet:
The Local Access Network Perspective (visited Dec. 11, 1996) <http:// ksgwww. harvard. edu/
iip/ lalani. html>.
84. Cable companies traditionally used a tree and branch configuration. To take full
advantage of fiber's greater bandwidth, cable companies have converted to a fiber-to-the-
feeder ("FTTF") or star-star-bus ("SSB") architecture. The hybrid fiber-coaxial configuration
send digital video via fiber to hubs within the community and then utilize existing coaxial
lines into subscribers' homes. See Grant & Berquist, supra note 4, at 4.
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cable companies, 5 or hybrid fiber/copper or twisted pair systemss employed
by telephone and electric companies. Each type of system has its advantages
and limitations. However, as technology continues to develop, what is state of
the art today could well be outdated by the time the network is completed. 7
Some cities are taking a gamble and selecting one standard over another.88
Most cities, however, are ill equipped to gamble on one or another inasmuch as
many cities currently utilitize multiple architectures.8 9 For this reason, there is
some advantage for cities to maintain a degree of flexibility in designing a
hybrid system which can be upgradable in five to ten years.
90
Second, cities must decide the nature and extent of equity participation,
and whether they want to compete with existing providers. 9' Cities often seek
equity participation to ensure openness and universal access.92 The level of
equity participation that can be negotiated, however, often depends upon a
city's contribution to the partnership and the extent to which it is willing to be
"at risk" for the debt obligations of the project.93 Cities typically have public
facilities, property, and rights-of-way including poles, which can be contrib-
uted, as well as having the authority to waive fees and taxes as incentives for
equity participation. 94 In Anaheim, California, for example, the City is to
receive a one-time payment of $6 million and annual revenues of $1 million or
five percent of gross revenues (whichever is greater) for its rights-of-way and
85. This configuration enables broadband, passive transmissions, generally required for
video delivery systems. Id. at 3. It is not, however, very effective with switched or interactive
services such as telephony.
86. Telephone companies use a circuit-switched star configuration, which remains un-
changed by introducing fiber. What has changed by using fiber is the conversion from analog
to digital and the need for advanced digital switching equipment, as well as fiber transmitters,
receivers, and amplifiers. While this configuration has worked well for switched voice,
telephone companies have introduced other standards to facilitate better video quality such as
ATM, asynchronous transfer mode, or SONET, synchronous optical network. Id. at 3-4.
87. Id. at 9.
88. The City of Austin, Texas, which operates a municipal utility, decided to look for a
strategic partner to build an advanced telecommunications network. After two years and 34
respondents, Austin selected Central & South West communications to build a hybrid
fiber/coax network to interconnect all homes, businesses, and institutions. Id. at 5-9.
89. See also Lalani, supra note 83, at 1.
90. See also Grant & Berquist, supra note 4, at 4, 10.
91. Id. at 9
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See sources cited supra note 4.
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existing fiber optic infrastructure.95 Anaheim is still in negotiations with its
strategic partner, SpectraNet International, and the system has not been built.
96
Whether the city of Anaheim will realize this revenue remains to be seen.
The possibility of equity participation must be offset by the associated
risks of being obligated on the debt. In Austin, Texas, for example, regulators
concluded that voters would not approve tax free municipal bond financing for
constructing their RTN, so they had to accept less equity participation. 9
Austin's proposal required a high bond debt of nearly one half of one billion
dollars, almost equal to their biggest municipal project, an airport.98 This
factor contributed significantly in their selection process for a provider.
It is important to note that in both the Anaheim and Austin scenarios, their
strategic partners are Competitive Access Providers ("CAPs"). CAPs and
some long distance carriers seem willing to give cities equity interests because
such partnerships give them entry into new markets and assure them a sub-
stantial customer to support their investment. Unfortunately, their proposals
often include associated risks-risks that all areas will not be serviced or self
funded, which many cities are unwilling to accept.99 Such proposals for equity
participation, however, do not seem forthcoming from existing providers. In
San Diego, for example, neither of the existing providers proposed equity
participation for the City, notwithstanding that it was an important evaluation
criteria and goal for the City.1°°
Finally, cities must contemplate how they will finance the project.
Financing plans in which a city is not at risk are highly speculative. Anaheim,
California is using project financing to develop its network at a cost of $50
million to $60 million.' 0 ' This means that financing for subsequent phases will
be contingent upon revenue generated from completed phases. Phase one will
connect commercial, industrial, and government buildings with fiber optic
cable. Phase two of the plan will extend the telecommunications system to
residential areas. 0 2 However, if there is insufficient revenue from phase one
of the project, phase two may never be built.
95. Anaheim City Council Approves Memorandum of Understanding with SpectraNet to
Build a Fiber Optic Universal Telecommunications System (Aug. 20, 1996)
<http://www.anaheim.netlutility/telecom5.html>.
96. Grant & Berquist, supra note 4, at 11.
97. Id. at 8.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 11.
101. Grant & Berquist, supra note 4, at I1.
102. Id.
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In some instances, the financial risks are such that existing plans must be
modified or abandoned. The cities of San Diego, California and Seattle,
Washington, for example, abandoned plans to build RTNs or expand their
existing public utility after passage of the Act, citing financing risks and
technology concerns.103 Both cities have opted, instead, to upgrade their
existing PVNs.1' 4
B. Municipal Initiatives for Strategic Partnerships
There is no prohibition against cities forming strategic partners with
existing providers or CAPs. However, as suggested earlier, existing providers
seem to have little incentive to develop strategic partnerships with cities or
with each other. This may be due to a variety of factors.
First, existing providers are already making the capital investment to
compete for existing and new telecommunications services. It is generally
private industry, not local governments, that has the financial and technical
means to develop the infrastructure. As a result, there seems to be little value
added in having the government as an equity partner. Moreover, the govern-
ment could pose a threat to existing providers as a competitor for these
services. It is unclear, however, whether the marketplace in most metropolitan
areas can support competition by telephone and cable companies, CAPs, and
local governments. In addition, some critics question whether this is an
appropriate role for cities.
Second, partnerships among providers to create seamless, ubiquitous
RTNs are unlikely. Interconnectivity among providers is impractical because
telephone companies, cable companies, and CAPs employ different, compet-
ing, and oftentimes incompatible technologies to provide the same services.
105
Consequently, from the government's perspective, it may be more prudent to
maintain existing relations with multiple providers until the industry becomes
more mature.
Third, in many areas, local governments are already contracting with one
or more providers for a variety of telecommunication and video services. This
dependency would not be eliminated by cities developing a new RTN.
Assuming that financing is available, it would still take years before a RTN
was developed. The Austin, Texas project, for example, is projected to take
six years to complete after a final franchise agreement is completed.1 6 In
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See discussion supra pp. 526-27.
106. Grant & Berquist, supra note 4, at 9.
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Anaheim, phase one is expected to be completed within two years, while
building phase two of their RTN will be done over five years thereafter.'07
In the interim, these governments would presumably still have to contract
with existing providers or resellers to ensure that government operations
continue to function effectively. This will likely result in redundant networks
being maintained. In addition, this problem is not eliminated by dealing with
CAPs or resellers. Resellers and CAPs must still negotiate interconnectivity
with existing providers, which has been found in many instances to be very
difficult.
Fourth, building a RTN from the bottom up without a partner is often-
times not fiscally possible. The capital costs are significant and there is great
uncertainty about the applications and services which are needed to generate
the revenue to support such a network. There are also recurring management
and administrative costs, which often cannot be met from existing revenue
sources. Many cities lack the in-house technical support to perform these
tasks, which means those services must be contracted to outside vendors.
Existing providers and resellers have a competitive advantage here because
they have the benefits of economies of scale achieved by restructuring their
services using shared resources. This gives them existing revenue streams to
offset the capital costs of upgrading their systems. Existing providers are
being conservative in their expansion plans by upgrading their systems in
stages to ensure that revenue from new applications and services will justify
their investment. Consequently, it is doubtful that a city could offer more
competitive rates and services in the short term than would be available from
existing providers.
C. Regulation of Municipal RTNs Under the Act
There are two ways a municipal RTN can provide telecommunication
services to the public. The first is as a facilities-based carrier, where a city
would own, control, operate, and/or maintain. 1°8 The second is as a reseller,
where a city would not construct any facility but would purchase unbundled
network elements from the LEC or resell an incumbent's retail service."°9
As a facilities-based carrier, a municipal RTN can sell or lease their
facilities, lines, or conduits to any person." 0 A municipal RTN would be
107. Id. at 11.
108. Commission Adopts Rules to Implement Local Competition Provisions of Telecom-
munications Act of 1996 (August 1, 1996) <http:llwww.fcc.gov/nrcc6052.html>.
109. Id.
110. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 12804-12808 (Deering 1990).
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required to file tariffs with the state PUC for telecommunications services, as
would other telecommunication carriers. In addition, a facilities-based carrier
must also make its services available for resale to other telecommunication
carriers on a nondiscriminatory basis."'
In California, for example, municipal facilities-based carriers must
provide service to any customer who requests it and is located within 300 feet
of their transmission facilities.1 2 They are not required to build out facilities
further than 300 feet, although it could readily service such customers through
the use of unbundled wireline or wireless local loops obtained from a LEC.
Additionally, such carriers must submit a Proponent's Environmental Assess-
ment for any construction project that will withstand review under the Califor-
nia Environmental Quality Act.1 13
Cities can also be resellers of LECs such as Pacific Bell or GTE for local
and intraLATA services, as well as for interLATA services from any other
certificated provider. As a reseller, a city would not be limited to providing
services within the city or the surrounding region, but could apply for state-
wide authority."14
As any other telecommunications carrier, a city RTN would be required
to serve all customers requesting service within its designated territory on a
nondiscriminatory basis." 5 The service area map must be filed with the state
PUC. The bulk of certification requirements pertain to financial qualifications
that a city should be able to meet."
16
RTN providers will likely qualify for a Certificate of Public Convenience
and Necessity ("CPCN") for local, intraLATA, and interLATA telecommuni-
cations services within the state. The certification requirements are not
onerous and are easier for resellers, who do not have to construct facilities,
111. Id. § 1001. Decisions granting Certificates of Public Convenience and Necessity for
all facilities-based carriers are further required to provide services for the Deaf and Disabled
(they can be the resale of LEC services) and 611 repair service. Finally, redlining is prohib-
ited and subject to strong action by the FCC. Id. § 4.
112. California Public Utilities Commission Decision 96-02-072 app. E, at 8 § F(2) (Feb.
23, 1996).
113. See id. at app. E.
114. See California Public Utilities Commission Decision 95-12-056, app. C, at 9 § F
(Dec. 20, 1995).
115. Id. The city would be required to provide 1+ presubscription or l0xxx equal access
to any interexchange carrier which subscribes to its switched access services. Id. § F(5).
116. See California Public Utilities Commission Decision 95-12-056, app. C (Dec. 20,
1995).
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than for facilities-based services. 17 Many facilities-based providers are also
authorized resellers.
If a municipal RTN uses any type of satellite services, the FCC has the
authority to regulate such services." 8 The FCC has the exclusive jurisdiction
over Direct Broadcast Satellite services and can preempt tariff and rate
regulation of competitive telecommunications companies without market
power.119 As a result, cities cannot impose any taxes or fees on satellite
services providing direct-to-home programming,' 20 nor can they impose any
assessment or tax for the privilege of doing business, regulating, or raising
revenue. 121
Municipal RTN services provided through radio bands or microwave
technologies would require an FCC license, 12 if they have not already ob-
tained such authority.'23 Many municipally-owned public utilities are set up as
cooperatives and are therefore exempt from regulation governing utilities,
rights-of-way, or pole attachments. 24 As a result, municipal utilities would
have broad discretion in their service offerings and operations.
While the Act generally permits a reasonable rate of return on intercon-
nection fees of a LEC or a facilities-based provider, cities such as San Diego,
California generally are precluded from making a profit on business enterprises
absent specific authorization.125 Municipal utilities, generally, may set rates
and charges for their services which will allow them to be self-supporting.' 26
However, they are restricted in being able to charge for large expenditures and
the interest thereon for future needs.12 7 As a result, municipal RTNs could not
include a profit charge for access or fees.
117. Neither certification process is particularly difficult, and many state PUCs try to
expedite the processing of all such applications.
118. Telecommunications Act § 205(b).
119. Id.
120. Id. § 602(a).
121. Id. § 602(b)(5).
122. The FCC maintains statutory authority to grant licenses to the communications
industry. T. BARTON CARTER ET AL., MASS COMMUNICATION LAW 328 (West Publishing, 4th
ed. 1994).
123. See also Commission Adopts Streamlined Licensing Rules and Procedures for Fixed
Microwave Services, Report No. DC 96-10, 1996 WL 54272, at *1 (F.C.C. Feb. 8, 1996).
124. See Matter of Helicon Group, 1996 FCC LEXIS 821, at *6 n.9 (citing 47 U.S.C. §
224 (1994) (utility does not include any entity that is cooperatively owned)). Municipal
utilities are exempt from regulation under the Pole Attachment Act. Id.; CAL PUB. UTIL
CODE § 767.5(a)(1) (Deering 1990).
125. See Ravettino v. San Diego, 160 P.2d 52, 56 (Cal. Ct. App. 1945).
126. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 12809 (Deering 1990).
127. Id.
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IV. CITY INITIATIVES AS USERS OF RTNs
As users of a RTN, cities have two primary goals: 1) to ensure favorable
rates for city government services and 2) to ensure that all city residents have
universal access to telecommunication services at affordable prices. In some
ways, these two goals seem at odds with each other. The need for reasonable
access and interconnection rates from providers must be reconciled with
universal access which must be subsidized by providers. While universal
service will likely be achieved through federal and state regulation, it is
included as a "user need" because cities can sometimes leverage their role as
users to obtain favorable disposition for their residents.
A. Leveraging City User Needs for Favorable Rates
Cities who choose not to build RTNs may instead opt to upgrade their
existing PVNs and rely upon competition from private providers to address
city concerns.'2 Sunnyvale, California chose not to compete as a gateway
with private providers. Instead, the City has formed a strategic partnership
with nine other Santa Clara counties to aggregate their purchasing power with
existing providers. 129  This partnership is negotiating with Pacific Bell to
rebuild its county infrastructure to enable video and data services in addition to
voice services.130 To meet internal needs, the City has designed, administered,
managed, and maintained its own PVN. The PVN provides interconnectivity
to other government sites using a FDDI13 1 fiber backbone with inter and
intranet nodes and wired remotes sites using ISDN 32 lines.3 The school
districts operate autonomously but will have access to the City's network.
The City of San Diego has joined with San Diego County to develop a
Private Virtual Network to service their internal and regional needs.' 34 The
PVN will be composed of San Diego's existing networks called SanNet'
35
128. See Grant & Berquist, supra note 4, at 11.
129. Sunnyvale Telecommunications Policy, supra note 6, at 20.
130. Id.
131. FDDI means Fiber Data Distributed Interface. It is a two-ring configuration which
is counterdirectional to ensure redundancy in the network.
132. Integrated Services Digital Network is an international set of recommendations and
standards for digital networks. WIAM STALUINGS, INTEGRATED SERvIcEs DIMAL
NETwORKS 103 (1988).
133. Telephone Interview with Shawn Hernadez, Director of Information Services, City
of Sunnyvale (Dec. 18, 1996).
134. San Diego RFP, supra note 2, at 1.
135. Id. at 4.
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which serve the city government, city and county libraries, and several regional
justices within the San Diego LATA. This network includes a private,
switched, integrated PBX telephone network and a broadband data network
136linking Local Area Networks. It is proposed that this network will be
upgraded and expanded with fiber nodes.
Where cities or regions have decided to aggregate their collective user
needs, they have been able to negotiate favorable terms, such as postalized
rates, for access from existing providers. Postalized rates are flat rate charges
that are not based on distance. 137 The State of Ohio, for example, has been
able to obtain favorable postalized rates for government and institutional users
negotiating directly with existing carriers, Ameritech and LCI. 138 While such
rates do not include commercial or resell use, it does seem to indicate that
existing providers are amiable to providing some discounts for aggregated
services.
B. Universal Service
The challenge for universal access is to design a market system that will
drive subsidy levels down over time.13 9 Traditionally, "universal service" has
meant access to basic telephone service.14° Under the Act, "universal service"
will mean affordable telecommunications services for everyone, including
136. Ie. at 7.
137. Postalized rates are generally divided into interLATA and intraLATA rates but not
based upon a per mile distance. In some instances, these rates can also include flat rates not
tied to per minute or per usage units, typically found in switched lines. Interview with Fredric
Goldberg, Senior Network Architect, NASA Lewis Research Center (Dec. 27, 1996).
138. Interview with Paul Karas, Contractor for the Department of Administrative Ser-
vices, State of Ohio (July 1996). Ohio originally proposed to build a $180 million statewide
broadband fiber optic network known as State of Ohio Multi-Agency Communications System
("SOMACS") to connect state buildings, local governments, schools, libraries, and universi-
ties. Telecommunications Subcommittee Report, Prepared for Inter-Agency Telecommunica-
tions Committee, State of Ohio, 10-14 (1993). The State rationalized that it was not cost
effective or reliable for the government to manage, maintain, and service the network, even
though the State was interested in some equity participation. As a result, the State concluded
that it was better to contract with existing carriers to service its needs on their networks.
These carriers were selected over other existing providers in part because of their superior
pricing schedule and willingness to postalize the rates. The SOMACS system is restricted to
state functions including government and institutional operations. Id.
139. Statement of Reed E. Hundt, supra note 54, at 7.
140. Brenda J. Tralnor, Manager Regional Telecommunications, Clark County, Nevada,
The Local Government Perspective: Can the Harmonica Play in the Symphony, Address at the
New York Law School's Conference: Universal Service in Context: A Multidisciplinary
Perspective (Dec. 6, 1995), at <http://cdinet.comBenton/Retrieveluniv-service l.txt>.
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every classroom, library, and health care facility.' 41 When and how this will be
achieved has been delegated to a new joint State-Federal Board (the "Board")
established under the Act.' 42 It is noteworthy that city participation has been
conspicuously excluded from the Board. This is a fundamental flaw in
implementing universal service because all communications efforts begin and
end with the local loop. 143 Until this is remedied, the cities' only leverage to
ensure universal access is through their role as a user or contractor in negoti-
ating agreements with existing providers.
What is known is that the universal service pool will require subsidies of
approximately $12 billion.' 44 The largest piece will be for residential rate
assistance.145  One proposal is to fund the pool using a nondiscriminatory
compensation structure that includes a variety of payment forms: "cash,
capacity, service and cooperative local infrastructure development."
14'
The Act requires the Board to make recommendations to the FCC, which
is authorized to establish and conduct periodic reviews' 47 of rules to define
148
and promote universal service and access. 49 The Act provides certain conces-
sions for municipal institutions, 50 subject to some restrictions.' 51  Rates
141. See Statement of Reed E. Hundt, supra note 54, at 7. The Board recently redefined
universal service to reflect "evolving" levels of services including access to advanced services
that change as technology improves.
142. Section 254(b) establishes the following principles for ensuring universal access: 1)
to provide quality services at just, reasonable, and affordable rates; 2) to furnish all regions of
the Nation with advanced telecommunications and information services; 3) to provide all
consumers with access to similar service; and 4) to try to nondiscriminatorily preserve and
advance universal service. Telecommunications Act § 254(b).
143. Trainor, supra note 140, at 5.
144. Statement of Reed E. Hundt, supra note 54, at 7.
145. Id.
146. Trainor, supra note 140, at 4.
147. See Telecommunications Act § 402(a).
148. Id. § 254(c)(3). This definition currently includes special services provided to
schools, libraries, and health care providers.
149. Id. § 254(c).
150. Id. § 254 (h)(5)(C).
151. The city would be specifically precluded from reselling any services provided to the
schools, health care providers, or libraries for compensation. Id. § 254(h)(3). Providers
cannot, for example, resell Internet access to third parties if it was provided under this
program. The city would, however, be eligible for favorable cost treatment for any schools
with an endowment of less than $50,000,000 or libraries that participate in state-based funds
under Title III of the Library Services and Construction Act. Telecommunications Act §
254(h)(4).
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provided by "eligible telecommunications carriers" 152 for service to public
schools and libraries for educational purposes shall be discounted by an
amount determined by the FCC and the state PUC to ensure affordable
access. 53 The FCC is also required to establish "competitively neutral" rules
to enhance advanced telecommunications and information services for all
public and nonprofit elementary and secondary school classrooms, health care
providers, and libraries. Moreover, a telecommunications carrier would not be
able to cross subsidize non-competitive services with competitive services.
15 4
This means that the pricing of government-based services would be indepen-
dent of pricing for educational related services. What is unclear is whether
these provisions will ensure more favorable rates than if cities, by aggregating
their needs, negotiated with ineligible carriers.
Another option for cities is to provide incentives to providers for access to
public rights-of-way in exchange for universal service. Sunnyvale, California,
for example, advocates that providers be required to maintain open networks
through their common carrier obligations.15 5 The City wants to allow private
investors access to public rights-of-way for no or low cost as compensation in
lieu of full or partial encroachment fees.' 56 By leveraging municipal resources
and facilities, cities may be able to ensure that residents get affordable access
to telecommunication services such as Internet access.
V. IMPACT OF ACT ON CrrY INITIATIVES AS REGULATORS OF RTNs
Cities regulate RTNs under the Act through control over access to public
rights-of-way 57 and in exercise of their franchise authority. 58 The major issue
for cities as regulators is the extent to which they can impose recurring or
annual fees or other charges on telecommunication providers pursuant to their
152. Eligible telecommunications carriers are common carriers or entities designated as
such by the state PUC as eligible to receive Federal Universal Service Support for health,
education, and library services. 47 U.S.C. § 214 (1994). This section was amended by
section 102(e)(1) of the Telecommunications Act.
153. Telecommunications Act § 254(h)(1)(B).
154. Id. § 254(k).
155. Sunnyvale Telecommunications Policy, supra note 6, at 20.
156. IcL
157. See, e.g., Saathoff v. City of San Diego, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d 352, 354 (Cal. Ct. App.
1995). Section 105 of the San Diego City Charter vests control in the City over the use of the
streets and other public places.
158. See, e.g. SAN DiEGO Crry CHARTER ch. 44 (1993), § 103 Franchises; § 103.1 Regu-
lation of Public Utilities; § 104 Term and Plan of Purchase; and § 105 Right of Regulation
(granting San Diego the power to grant franchises to any person, firm, or corporation).
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franchise authority. 59 A franchise is "created when a governmental agency
authorizes private companies to set up their infrastructures on public property
in order to provide public utilities to the public."1'6
A. Franchise Fee Obligations on Video Providers
Cities exercise local franchise authority over cable companies and other
video providers by granting nonexclusive franchises. 6' These franchises are
adopted by city ordinance through a negotiated franchise agreement. The grant
of a franchise neither precludes cities from building their own video delivery
system, 62 nor prevents cities from granting other franchises. 63 Under cable
franchise agreements, entities are generally required to pay annual franchise
fees tied to a percentage of their gross revenues. In addition, cities may
negotiate other concessions, such as public access channels.' 64
In Sunnyvale, California, for example, the City currently has franchise
agreements for wireless communications with MetroCom and for cable TV
services with TCL 65 Under these agreements, the franchisee pays five percent
of gross revenues to the City which are deposited in the general fund.
66
Notwithstanding local franchise authority, cities are expressly preempted
from imposing franchise obligations on cable companies providing telecom-
159. In San Diego, for example, the City Council is empowered to: 1) provide reasonable
terms and conditions of operation; 2) certify franchises for specific terms in accordance with
the laws of the State; 3) terminate the franchise where the welfare of the City necessitates; 4)
vest in the City plenary control over all primary and secondary uses of the City's streets and
public places; and 5) grant franchises as prescribed by ordinance with the franchisee paying
compensation to the City in the amount set forth in such ordinance. Id. § 105.
160. Saathoff, 41 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 356.
161. In San Diego, for example, the City Council granted a nonexclusive franchise to
American Television and Communications Corporation. San Diego, Cal., Ordinance 0-15213
(Mar. 10, 1980). This franchise covers all areas in the corporate limits of the City of San
Diego and automatically terminates in the year 2010 with the provisions of the ordinance
renegotiable every fifth year. Id. § 6.
162. A franchisee does not have a cause of action for diminished value should the city
build a RTN which focuses on video program services. In Helena Water Works Co. v.
Helena, 195 U.S. 383, 388 (1904), the Supreme Court clearly stated that "the grant of the
franchise does not of itself raise an implied contract that the grantor will not do any act to
interfere with the rights granted" to the franchise holder.
163. For example, the San Diego Ordinance governing cable franchisees does not restrict
cable competition regardless of need. San Diego, Cal., Ordinance 0-15213 (Mar. 10, 1980).
See City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 494-96 (1986).
164. 47 U.S.C. § 543 (1988).
165. Telephone Interview with Shawn Hernadez, supra note 133.
166. Sunnyvale Telecommunications Policy, supra note 6, at 12-13.
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munications services under the Act.167 This means that while cities could grant
competing franchises for cable television services, 168 they could arguably not
extract additional concessions from existing franchisees seeking to provide
telecommunications services. 169 Moreover, they could not condition the grant
of any franchise or renewal on providing telecommunications services. 170 In
the event of a sale, however, this would not preclude cities from negotiating
favorable concessions from a cable company. The City of Seattle, Washington
for example, following a sale of the cable franchise by Viacom to TCI, is
leveraging its position to negotiate with TCI for favorable residential high
speed Internet access.'
7
'
Cities may also impose fees on LECs that provide video programming
under "open video systems."' 72 These fees are tied to the gross revenue in lieu
of franchise fees in cities subject to statewide franchises. The only caveat is
that the rates cannot exceed the fees imposed on cable operators.
173
B. Just Compensation for Use of Rights-of-Way
Cities are specifically authorized by the Act' 74 and the state PUCs 175 to
receive "just and reasonable" compensation for use of their rights-of-way, as
well as for roof rights for wireless service proceeding. Moreover, these rights
may not be unnecessarily withheld. Cities are permitted to establish such fees
167. Telecommunications Act § 303(a)(3)(C).
168. A "cable television system" is defined as a system of antennas, cables, wires, lines,
towers, waves guides, or any other conductors, converters, equipment, or facilities designed
and constructed for the purpose of producing, receiving, amplifying, and distributing, audio,
video, and other forms of electronic or electrical signals. Id.
169. Id. § 303(a)(3)(D).
170. Id.
171. Grant & Berquist, supra note 4, at 11.
172. Telecommunications Act § 653.
173. Id. § 653(c)(2)(B).
174. Section 253(c) provides in pertinent part: "Nothing in this section affects the
authority of a... local government to manage the public rights-of-way or to require fair and
reasonable compensation from telecommunications providers, on a competitively neutral and
nondiscriminatory basis, .. if the compensation required is publicly disclosed by such
government." Id. § 253(c).
175. The CPUC provides in part:
It is therefore the intent of the Legislature that public utilities and publicly owned
utilities be fairly and adequately compensated for the use of their rights-of-way
and easements for the installation of fiber optic cable, and that.., publicly
owned utilities have the ability, if they so desire, to negotiate a purchase, lease, or
rent of access to those fiber optic cables for their own use.
CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 767.7(b) (Deering 1990).
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by negotiated contracts on a nondiscriminatory, competitively neutral basis. 76
Once the fees have been established, they must be filed with the state PUC.177
The FCC and state PUCs have jurisdiction to review such fees following a
complaint that they are unreasonable.
Some argue that any fees imposed must be tied to actual or incremental
costs, or some related cost formula versus a revenue based formula. 178
Moreover, while there is no specific language that fees may be charged on an
on going basis, reliance on the pole attachment provisions suggest that cities
may be able to charge annual fees if they own and operate RTNs, or own their
conduits or poles. The problem confronting many cities like San Diego is that
they do not own existing utilities or facilities.
The Act preempts cities from taking any action that would be construed as
imposing a market barrier.179 Whether cities have violated this restriction is
left to the states, 80 which generally are sympathetic to existing providers to
protect their interests and to foster competition.181 Neither the FCC, nor most
state PUCs, have addressed city entitlements to compensation for private use
of public rights-of-way. As a result, city authority to regulate RTNs is limited,
and the scope of their ability to receive.compensation remains unclear. This is
particularly problematic for some cities in states like California.
C. Franchise Fee Obligations on Public Utilities
Franchise requirements are generally imposed on any public utility, which
include the entities supplying inhabitants with light, water, power, heat,
transportation, telephone service, or other means of communication.18 2
Telephone companies'83 in states like California, however, have a statewide
franchise which limits a city's ability to collect annual fees. 84 This statewide
176. Id.
177. See Telecommunications Act § 252(h).
178. See id. § 252(d); see also CAL. PUB. UTIL CODE § 767.5 (Deering 1990).
179. Section § 253(a) provides: "No State or local statute or regulation, or other State or
local legal requirement, may prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the ability of any entity
to provide any interstate or intrastate telecommunications service." Telecommunications Act
§253(a).
180. See id. §§ 252(b)(1), 703 (regarding arbitration and pole attachments).
181. Grant & Berquist, supra note 4, at 9.
182. See, e.g., SAN DiEGo CrrY CHA'rER ch. 44, § 105 (1993).
183. The California Public Utilities Code defines telephone corporation as "every corpo-
ration or person owning, controlling, operating, or managing any telephone line for compen-
sation within this State." CAL PUB. UTIL CODE § 234 (Deering 1990).
184 Section 7901 states that a "telephone corporation may construct lines.., along and
upon any public road...." CAL PUB. UTI CODE § 7901 (West 1996).
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franchise applies to all telephone companies operating within the state, even if
they also provide video and data services. 185 This restriction does not apply,
however, to other public utilities like electric companies, nor does it preclude
cities from imposing utility user taxes.
Sunnyvale, California for example, proposes to create an advanced
digital, broadband, telecommunications infrastructure. 186 Pacific Bell, as the
LEC, and alternative service providers are exempt from local franchising
requirements including franchise fees, but must obtain encroachment permits
for underground construction.' 87 The City also has an indefinite franchise
agreement with Pacific Gas & Electric for gas and electric service, under
which it pays a franchise fee of one percent of gross revenues. PG&E has
unrestricted access to rights-of-way, although it also must obtain an encroach-
ment permit, but it is not subject to the customer service standards imposed on
TCI as its cable provider.
While state PUCs like the California Public Utilties Commission preclude
cities from collecting franchise fees from telephone companies, PUCs do allow
annual, recurring fees' 88 to be assessed by telephone companies and other
public utilities. This is in addition to an "annual cost of ownership"' 89 for
access to private utility poles and supporting structures.' 9° This disparity in the
ability to collect compensation for public and private rights-of-way is unjusti-
fiable. In essence, these cities cannot collect annual franchise fees from
telephone companies for use of public streets even though these same compa-
nies can charge others for access to their privately owned conduits.' 91 This
185. Id. § 7901(3).
186. Sunnyvale Telecommunications Policy, supra note 6, at 6.
187. Id. at 7.
188. In California, for example, the annual fee for pole attachment shall be $2.50 in the
first year. Thereafter, the annual fee shall be $2.50 or 7.4% of the public utility's annual cost
of ownership for the pole and supporting anchor. CAL. PUB. UTIL CODE § 767.5 (c)(2)(A)
(Deering 1990).
189. The ."[a]nnual cost of ownership' means the sum of the annual capital costs and
annual operation costs of the support structure[s] ... owned by the public utility. The basis
for computation of annual capital costs shall be historical capital costs less depreciation." Id.
§ 767.5(a)(9).
190. "Supporting structure" includes a duct or conduit, manhole, or handhole. Id. §
767.5(a)(2).
191. The Telecommunications Act imposes on all LECs obligations to provide resale,
access to rights-of-way, and establish reciprocal compensation arrangements for transport and
termination of traffic. Telecommunications Act § 251(b).
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means that these cities arguably will not receive franchise fees from resellers
of LEC telecommunication services or others who interconnect with LECs. 192
Cities do have the right to impose permit fees, such as the encroachment
fees previously discussed. 193 Such fees are fixed, one time costs that are
nominal and would not account for on going maintenance of public rights-of-
way.
D. Alternatives for Non-Municipal Utility Cities
There are two possible alternative sources of revenue that may be
available to cities who do not own municipal utility facilities, such as poles or
conduits, and/or who are subject to statewide franchise restrictions. The first is
for cities to build municipally-owned conduits for public and private access.
The second is imposing utility user taxes on telecommunication providers.
Under the first option, cities would continue to process permit applica-
tions of existing carriers for access to existing private conduits or poles, until
they reach capacity. Cities could then require that all new installation of lines
or networks be through conduits that the city would install and/or maintain.194
This action would presumably be pursuant to a telecommunication policy that
recognized the city's role as a facilitator or regulator to coordinate access and
use of public rights-of-way.
It is ill-advised to apply this requirement to existing conduits because
such action would likely constitute a taking, requiring compensation by the
government. A phased-in approach, however, allows existing facilities to
continue to operate while addressing the likely proliferation of new telecom-
munications carriers, and, therefore, the increased need in access to infra-
structure conduits.
Such an approach could be justified on four grounds. First, cities have the
authority pursuant to their police powers to coordinate among access providers
192. It is noteworthy that section 7901 of the CPUC is outdated and needs to be revised
to account for new technology such as fiber optics and the convergence of services which
allow cable to provide telephony over its coaxial lines. Instead, it focuses upon the method of
transmission as a point of distinction for application of statewide franchise rules. CAL PUB.
UTIL CODE § 7901.
193. See SAN DIGO MUNICIPAL CODE § 62.0102 (1992) (governing city rights-of-way).
The Code also allows the City Council to establish a schedule of fees for permits to improve
or encroach within rights of way. Such fees may include fixed charges to cover the City costs.
Id. § 62.0109.
194. It is possible that this may be subject to legal challenge as a market entry barrier to
the extent it precluded a carrier from engineering its network in the most efficient manner
from a technical and economic perspective.
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and establish a process for gaining access to city rights-of-way. 195 If all new
cables, lines, etc. were passed through city owned conduits, it would minimize
the likely disruption to streets which cause congestion and a potential public
hazard. In this way, cities would be leasing space in their conduits, which is
consistent with their rights as municipal utilities or telecommunication carriers.
Second, the Act clearly contemplates that interconnection for telecommu-
nications services be implemented through a coordinated planning process.
196
Establishing a process through city ordinance would effect the purpose to
minimize redundancy, maximize planning and coordination, and facilitate
interconnectivity. Third, as long as the rates were competitively neutral,
nondiscriminatory, reasonable, and did not prohibit any telecommunications
carrier from entering the market, there likely would be no basis for state or
federal preemption.
Finally, the LECs and cable companies still would be able to utilize their
existing conduits for internal expansion, or lease space on their poles and
conduits to third parties until they reach capacity. As new providers would
have a choice in who to lease capacity from, this approach would not likely be
construed as anticompetitive.
97
Cities could also consider imposing utility user taxes on users of utility
services which include public utilities, cable and telephone companies, and
arguably telecommunications carriers.' 98  The City of Sunnyvale imposes a
utility-user tax of two percent on all utilities, including PG&E and Pacific
Bell. 199 In many instances, utilities collect the tax from users to give to the
state. States then distribute to cities on a proportional basis. Such taxes are
authorized generally by federal statute2°° but also must be specifically author-
195. Section 62.0105(c) provides:
A permittee shall notify all public utilities of his request to construct improve-
ments or encroachments with the rights-of-way and shall coordinate with the
public utilities in order that any necessary relocations of existing facilities may be
done in an orderly fashion without interrupting the continuity of service or en-
dangering life or property.
SAN DIEGO MUNICIPAL CODE § 62.0105(c).
196. Section 256(a)(1) of the Act established procedures used when there is an oversight
by the Commission regarding coordinated network planning and design by telecommunica-
tions carriers and other providers for interconnectivity. Telecommunications Act § 256(a)(1).
197. See, e.g., Jerry L. Beane, Antitrust, 25 TEX. TECH L. REv. 453, 458 (1994).
198. The City of Sunnyvale imposes the utility user tax on alternative access providers.
Sunnyvale Telecommunications Policy, supra note 6, at 12.
199. Id.
200. The Internal Revenue Code permits the imposition of a 3% tax on local telephone
service, toll, and teletype service. I.R.C. § 4223 (1997). This tax does not apply to private
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ized in each state's constitution and under city charter or authority.201 Utility
user taxes are not specifically addressed by the Act.
It is important to note that while such taxes may not be viewed as a
market barrier, taxes generally are perceived by industries as disincentives to
economic development in an area. San Diego, for example, uses the fact that it
does not impose user taxes as an attraction for new businesses to the area.
Consequently, imposing a utility user tax is recommended only as a last
alternative and where there are other incentives that can offset any adverse
perception.
VI. CONCLUSION
There is no question that RTNs will be developed and that cities will play
critical roles. The exact nature of that role will undoubtedly depend upon a
variety of factors. Chief among them will be a city's existing resources, such
as whether it owns its own utility; the level of risk it is willing to assume; and
the level of interest from existing and new providers to form strategic partner-
ships. It is this author's opinion that cities should focus attention on develop-
ing strategic partnerships among themselves and other institutional users which
can be leveraged in negotiating favorable terms from existing providers. In
many ways the uncertainty associated with technology may warrant that cities
use a combination of technologies until network systems become ubiquitous.
It is likely that the revenue generator for cities will be applications and services
it chooses to provide, rather than revenue from owning the pipeline. What is
important is that cities move forward in some direction now. The information
highway is being built, and cities need to have access to some infrastructure
that enables them to compete on it.
systems or enhanced services, defined as communication services furnished to a subscriber
that gives subscriber exclusive or priority use of channel or to intercommunication systems for
the subscriber's station regardless of whether connected through switching network. Id.
201. See Johnson, supra note 8, at 521-22. Taxes should be distinguished from fees in
that taxes are a public burden imposed on citizens for government purposes without reference
to particular individual or property. They are generally imposed to raise money for the
government. An assessment or fee is imposed for improvements and is beneficial to particular
individual and imposed in relation to benefit. See also Fenton v. City of Delano, 208 Cal.
Rptr. 486 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
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